光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第6606期

主题：Optimal subsidy beneficiaries to promote electric vehicle adoption促进电动汽车普及的最优补贴对象

主讲人：苏州大学 冯博教授

主持人：管理科学与工程学院 肖辉教授

时间：10月25日 9:30-11:30

举办地点：腾讯会议ID:460-579-9016

主办单位：管理科学与工程学院 科研处

主讲人简介：

冯博，苏州大学商学院院长、教授、博导。国家级领军人才，国家优秀青年基金获得者。兼任江苏省新时代民营经济研究院院长和东吴资本市场研究院院长，担任POM-China战略咨询委员会委员、中国管理科学与工程学会常务理事等多个学术任职。

内容简介：

Electric vehicles (EVs) are increasingly approved as a disruptive technology that can limit oil consumption and reduce carbon emissions. Recognizing this, governments worldwide are continuously offering subsidies to promote EV adoption. However, the issue of identifying optimal beneficiaries remains inadequately addressed due to some critical though unexplored aspects. One of the conspicuously missing aspects is whether channel structures make a difference in selecting optimal beneficiaries. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore whom to subsidize (i.e., consumers, manufacturers, or both) to better realize the intended objectives under varying distribution channels of EVs (from retail channels to direct channels). Our analysis reveals that optimal beneficiaries to reduce consumer expenditure are largely affected by the channel structure while relying on the manufacturer’s R&D efficiency and consumers’ expectation for government subsidy. We also extend our analysis to show that when beneficiaries are well-selected, the direct channel, in most cases, outperforms the retail channel in terms of consumer expenditure and manufacturer’s R&D level. As such, our analysis provides governors with advanced guidelines to select subsidy beneficiaries and compelling evidence to encourage direct selling.

电动汽车(EV)作为一项能够限制石油消耗和减少碳排放的颠覆性技术，越来越受到人们的认可。认识到这一点，世界各国政府不断提供补贴，以促进电动汽车的普及。然而，由于一些关键但尚未探索的方面，确定最佳受益者的问题仍然没有得到充分解决。其中一个明显缺失的方面是，渠道结构在选择最佳受益者方面是否会产生影响。本文建立了一个博弈论模型，探讨在不同的电动汽车分销渠道(从零售渠道到直销渠道)下，补贴谁(即消费者、制造商或两者)才能更好地实现预期目标。分析表明，渠道结构对消费者支出减少的最优受益者影响较大，同时依赖于制造商的研发效率和消费者对政府补贴的期望。我们还扩展了我们的分析，表明当受益者被精心选择时，在大多数情况下，直接渠道在消费者支出和制造商的研发水平方面优于零售渠道。因此，我们的分析为州长选择补贴受益人提供了先进的指导方针，并为鼓励直销提供了令人信服的证据。